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All You Need Is Love? 
Frankfurt and Hegel on Love as Freedom 
Abstract 
 
  
Few philosophers have thought that freedom and love might be 
connected in an essential way. Harry Frankfurt is an exception. To be 
autonomous, he contends, is to follow the commands of love. 
Frankfurt’s account has important strengths, I argue, but it also ignores 
the interpersonal dimensions of love and thus fails to account for the 
ways in which love can reflect and perpetuate oppression. A richer 
approach, I propose, can be found in Hegel’s writings on ethics. Like 
Frankfurt, Hegel conceives of freedom partly in terms of love. But 
Hegel also recognizes that actual loving relationships are always shaped 
by social and political conditions. Love thus has limits; it can provide 
a partial degree of autonomy, but it can also be deformed by oppressive 
social and political realities.  
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All You Need Is Love? 
Frankfurt and Hegel on Love as Freedom 
 
  
Etymologically, ‘freedom’ and ‘friendship’ are closely connected. 
In German, frei (free) and Freund (friend) both derive from frijon, an 
earlier term for love (Benveniste 1973, 262-267).i A similar etymology 
occurs throughout the Indo-European world, in Latin, Greek, Slavic, 
Celtic and Persian. In each language, ‘freedom’ derives from a term 
originally referring to loving relationship with others.  
Despite this etymology, few philosophers have thought that 
freedom and love might be connected in an essential way. Harry 
Frankfurt is an exception. To be autonomous, he contends, is to follow 
the commands of love. In this paper, I argue that Frankfurt’s account 
has important strengths but that it also oversimplifies the connection 
between love and freedom. Frankfurt ignores the interpersonal 
dimensions of love and thus fails to account for the ways in which love 
can reflect and perpetuate oppression. A richer approach, I propose, 
can be found in Hegel’s writings on ethics. Like Frankfurt, Hegel 
conceives of freedom partly in terms of love. But Hegel also recognizes 
that actual loving relationships are always shaped by social and political 
conditions. Love thus has limits; it can provide a partial degree of 
autonomy, but it can also be deformed by oppressive social and 
political realities.  
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Love as Autonomy  
Does love contribute in any essential way to the living of a free and 
autonomous life? Kant thought not. The love that individuals feel for 
one another is pathological, on his view, and thus utterly lacking in 
moral value (Arroyo 2016). Like all feelings and desires, moreover, love 
has the potential to corrupt moral dispositions and thereby undermine 
our ability to act autonomously. There is often a trade-off, then, 
between feeling love and acting autonomously.  
This trade-off, Marilyn Friedman argues, is especially common in 
the experiences of women (Friedman 1998). Women are often 
expected to adjust their interests to conform to those of their partners, 
to defer to their wishes and decisions without adequate reciprocity. In 
many heterosexual relationships, the man’s wants and needs take 
precedence over the woman’s, with the couple’s long-term planning 
reflecting his goals more than hers. Such erosions of agency, Friedman 
argues, serve to diminish the autonomy of partners within actual loving 
relationships, typically along gendered lines. Instead of supporting 
women’s autonomy, she concludes, love can thus serve to reflect and 
reinforce persisting forms of oppression.  
Why, then, think that love might contribute in an essential way to 
autonomy? By connecting love with freedom, Frankfurt hopes to offer 
greater insight into the normative authority of love. Love is 
normatively significant, he argues, because it is more than just an 
immediate feeling or desire (Frankfurt 2004). To love is to care at such 
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a deep level that it is essential to who one is as a person, and the value 
of love is that it helps to make us who we most truly are. Frankfurt 
conceives of autonomy in terms of wholeheartedness (Frankfurt 1999). 
We are wholehearted when our deepest concerns, including our loves, 
are reflected in both our desires and our actions. Wholehearted actions 
are autonomous in that they are in no way imposed upon us, but rather 
come from our authentic selves. We are most fully ourselves, and in 
that sense free and autonomous, when we act wholeheartedly out of 
love. 
One strength of Frankfurt’s account is that it thus illuminates the 
normative authority of love. A second strength of his account is that it 
helps to address the problem of alienation within Kant’s conception 
of autonomy. Kantian freedom, Peter Railton has argued, requires that 
we detach from our own feelings and desires, thereby becoming 
alienated from ourselves (Railton 1984). Michael Stocker similarly 
challenges what he calls the “schizophrenia” of Kant’s theory: if duty 
is the only moral motive, then our attachments to others have no moral 
significance as such (Stocker 1976). These critiques focus on the 
detachment from and subordination of desire that is prominent within 
Kant’s account of freedom. Kant identifies autonomy with pure reason 
alone, and he regards everything falling outside of pure reason as 
heteronomous. Kantian autonomy thus comes at the cost of alienation 
from who we are and what we care about.  
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One Kantian reply to this critique rejects the suggestion of a 
hostility between reason and desire. As Lara Denis argues, Kant allows 
wide latitude for developing non-moral interests, since he regards only 
the misprioritization of desire, not desire itself, as vicious (Denis 1997). 
Kant holds that we should actively cultivate certain desires and 
emotions, specifically those that tend to facilitate moral action. But 
while this shows that Kantian autonomy does not require an 
antagonism between reason and desire, it does not successfully resolve 
the problem of alienation. Autonomy requires that we at all times stand 
“under a discipline of reason, and in all our maxims we must not forget 
our subjection to it” (Kant 1996, 206). Even when our desires accord 
with the commands of reason, freedom still ultimately requires 
following those commands. This represents a kind of self-subjection 
that is alienating without necessarily being antagonistic.   
Another reply to the critique denies the suggestion of a 
fundamentally divided conception of agency in Kant’s ethics. Kant 
certainly realizes that we are not purely rational beings. His goal is not 
that we become unfeeling robots, Barbara Herman argues, but rather 
that we learn to better harmonize the empirical self with the rational 
self (Herman 1993, 202-205). The problem remains, however, that the 
rational self’s autonomy is not freedom for the whole self. Indeed, 
Herman explicitly acknowledges that autonomy cannot, on Kant’s 
view, describe us as actual empirical agents. This is because Kant 
regards freedom as a kind of internal autocracy, wherein the rational 
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self has absolute authority over the empirical self (Kant 1997, 137-42). 
So, even though Kant does recognize the richness of human agency, 
he nonetheless restricts his conception of freedom to the rational self. 
He locates freedom exclusively in one capacity, an important one for 
sure, but by no means comprising the entirety of the self. Kant thus 
rejects the possibility that the whole agent, rather than just one part of 
herself, might be capable of freedom. 
Frankfurt, in contrast, responds to the problem of alienation by 
proposing an amendment to the Kantian account of freedom. He 
explicitly conceives of freedom along Kantian lines, as autonomous 
self-government (Frankfurt 1999). A free agent is one who is subject 
only to the commands of her own will. But whereas Kant insists that 
a free will is determined by pure reason alone, Frankfurt argues that a 
free will is instead determined by love and care. An agent is 
autonomous whenever her volitions derive from the essential character 
of her will. And the essential character of one’s will is not, as Kant 
thought, constituted by pure reason, but by one’s deepest concerns, 
especially one’s loves. Instead of requiring detachment from our 
deepest commitments and concerns, Frankfurt proposes, freedom 
thus consists in being absorbed within those commitments and 
concerns. When one loves, that love is essential to one’s agency, no 
less than the faculty of reason. Amended in this way, the Kantian 
conception of freedom no longer requires that we become alienated 
from our affective selves. We are autonomous when we heed the 
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commands of love and actively embrace our commitments and 
concerns, rather than trying to detach ourselves from them. 
However, Frankfurt oversimplifies the connection between love 
and freedom. The problem is that by defining love as a species of 
intrapersonal care, Frankfurt disregards the interpersonal dimensions 
of love. He thereby fails to address the ways in which love can reflect 
and reinforce oppression. Aristotle identifies one such interpersonal 
dimension of love when he describes the true friend as “another self,” 
one with whom one’s life is fundamentally shared (Aristotle 1999, 142). 
On Aristotle’s view, the distinctive value of such relationships is that 
they enlarge and extend the self by creating joint experience and 
awareness, i.e. by creating an integration of selves (Osborne 2009). The 
boundaries of the self are not, in love, those of the narrow individual. 
Rather, the boundaries of the self grow to encompass those that we 
love.  
Frankfurt studiously ignores this dimension of love because he 
thinks that we must abstract away from all of the diverse forms of love 
in order to understand love’s value generally. Love, on his view, is 
essentially a mode of caring, a “concern for the existence and the good 
of what is loved” (Frankfurt 2006, 40). It is wholly internal to 
individuals, rather than something that might also be partially 
constituted by actual relationships with others. This definition captures 
something important about love, but it also ignores the distinctive 
value of love as enlarging the self. Is love still freeing when it is richly 
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interpersonal, rather than just a mode of individual care? What does it 
mean to be wholehearted, to be most fully oneself, when that self is 
deeply integrated with another self? Frankfurt assumes a narrowly 
intrasubjective model of love (and freedom) and thus fails to consider 
the implications of the knitting together of selves that occurs within 
actual relationships. 
The richness of this interpersonal dimension of love is the central 
theme of the recent memoir and novel Levels of Life. There, Julian 
Barnes relates his immense grief over the death of his beloved wife of 
many years: “I wish you had met her, and so met more of me” (Barnes 
2013, 108). The love he is describing is not merely a deep-seated care, 
but also a profound integration of selves. His grief is not just that of 
losing an object of care, but of losing an essential part of his very self. 
And the experience of such a union stands in stark contrast to, for 
example, the experience of unrequited love. When love is unrequited 
there is a longing to connect more deeply with the other, but that union 
is not achieved. One possesses the feelings, desires, and even care of 
love, but that love is, by definition, frustrated and stunted. It is a mere 
shadow of what is experienced within actual loving relationships, and 
it thus lacks the depth and value of the union described by Barnes. 
Unrequited love does perhaps count as a species of love, but only 
minimally so, in contrast to the richness of love as the sharing of selves. 
Yet, Frankfurt focuses only upon the normative significance of ‘my 
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love’ to the exclusion of ‘our love,’ i.e. love as fundamentally shared 
within a relationship.  
Frankfurt also disregards a second important interpersonal 
dimension of love, namely that of the social forces that shape love. 
Does following the commands of the heart still make one autonomous 
if those commands are predicated upon oppression? Frankfurt’s 
account of love as freedom is abstracted away from social context and 
so it treats social realities as irrelevant to our prospects for autonomy. 
Aristotle again highlights the signifincance of this interpersonal 
dimension of love when he observes that inequality creates real barriers 
to friendships of the good, barriers that he regards as insurmountable 
(Aristotle 1999, 127-128). Significant imbalances of power tend to 
corrupt existing friendships and inhibit the formation of new ones. 
Inequalities of wealth, for instance, typically cause friends to focus too 
much upon considerations of utility in their relationship. As a result, 
such inequalities often cause friends to experience disproportionate 
levels of affection. A poor friend will love a rich friend more than he 
is loved in return, and this lack of symmetry impedes the deep sharing 
of selves that is essential to friendships of the good.  
Ignoring the social context that frames love can cause us to ignore 
the realities of actual relationships. Because humans are fundamentally 
social animals, the kind and degree of care that agents experience 
depends in part upon how they are situated within an actual social 
world. Consider the example of plaçage, a practice that flourished in 
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New Orleans during the 18th and 19th centuries. Plaçees were black 
mistresses of light skin, openly kept by wealthy white men. Most plaçees 
were free, but laws preventing interracial marriage ensured that the 
relationships lacked legal recognition.  With few legal rights, plaçees 
were always very much subject to their patrons. 
Some relationships of plaçage were apparently quite loving, though 
others certainly were not. But even at its most loving, plaçage was 
premised upon deep oppression. Though elegant, Quadroon balls 
were ultimately not far removed from the slave auctions where black 
women were routinely bought and sold. A plaçee could never be 
formally recognized as a wife, with the rights and protections that such 
recognition entailed for a woman and her children. Plaçees had only 
limited control over their matches, and they had no legal standing to 
protect them from abuse and abandonment.  
Love is no doubt possible within the context of plaçage, but is it 
immune to that context? Does a plaçee, trained from childhood to the 
role and then kept by a man to whom she is utterly subject, suddenly 
become autonomous in her subjection if she happens to fall in love 
with that man? Consider Jonathan Lear’s example of a slave who falls 
in love with her owner (Lear 2002). The history of actual slavery is one 
of fear, violence, and rape, hardly conditions conducive to the 
development of loving relationships. However, let us nonetheless 
imagine a case in which a slave does come to love her owner. If 
Frankfurt is correct, then loving slaves are fully autonomous whenever 
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they follow a master’s commands out of love, since actions motivated 
by love are, on his view, autonomous. The fact that such love takes 
place within a context that denies the slave’s personhood is, apparently, 
irrelevant to the slave’s prospects for autonomy.  
Indeed, Frankfurt’s explicit view is that a loving slave does act fully 
“autonomously when, out of love for his master, he serves his master’s 
ends” (Frankfurt 2002, 294). Slaves would, then, do well to love their 
masters; a slave who loves a master is lucky because that love allows 
her to become autonomous, despite her subjection. Frankfurt qualifies 
this conclusion only by noting that loving obedience is not necessarily 
the only way in which a slave might act autonomously. A loving slave 
might also act autonomously by running away or refusing to submit. 
All of these actions can be genuinely autonomous, he contends, loving 
obedience no less than the others.  
This attempt to isolate freedom of the will from actual social and 
political conditions is untenable. Who we are and what we care about 
depends to a significant degree upon the relationships, practices, and 
institutions into which we are socialized. And contexts of oppression 
shape people’s identities and concerns at a deep level. This is true of 
oppressors as well as oppressed, masters as well as slaves. Let us 
imagine, alternatively, a slave who is obedient not out of love, but 
because he has come to deeply identify with that role. Does 
wholehearted commitment to his position of servitude make him fully 
autonomous in that role? It may perhaps make him happier in his 
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obedience, but the problem remains that the role with which he 
identifies is itself deeply unfree. If he has internalized his subjection, 
then he has not really escaped it. And if he one day ceases to identify 
with that role, he will still nonetheless be a slave, trapped in his 
servitude.   
We need not collapse the distinction political freedom and 
freedom of the will in order to recognize that they are not radically 
independent of one another. Frankfurt thinks that love is freeing, but 
he fails to consider the ways in which love is formed and deformed by 
the social world. What is problematic is that he regards social realities 
of oppression as irrelevant to love, and hence to our prospects for 
autonomy, as though the heart is immune to the contexts in which it 
is embedded. Because Frankfurt ignores the interpersonal dimensions 
of love, he thus fails to consider whether love that is premised upon 
internalized subjection is truly freeing.  
 
Love as Finding Oneself in Another 
Frankfurt’s essential insight is that freedom consists in acting 
wholeheartedly, since we are most fully ourselves when we act out of 
love. Is it possible to retain this insight while at the same time 
recognizing the interpersonal dimensions of love? I propose an 
alternative Hegelian account of the connection between love and 
freedom. What is distinctive about this account is that, by recognizing 
the sociality of love as well as freedom, it explains how love can 
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contribute to human freedom but also reflect and perpetuate 
oppression.  
Like Frankfurt, Hegel’s account of love as freedom is rooted in a 
critique of the alienation and “self-coercion” within Kant’s conception 
of freedom (Hegel 1971, 244). Kantian freedom is alienating, Hegel 
contends, because it requires that agents be mastered by reason, even 
though reason is only one component of who we really are (Hegel 
1991, 217-218). The charge is that, in his attempt to avoid making 
reason a slave to desire, Kant instead subordinates everything empirical 
about agents to pure reason. He theorizes freedom for one part of the 
self by explicitly excluding the possibility of freedom for our whole 
selves.  
Hegel’s conception of freedom, in contrast, emphasizes unity and 
integration of the self. His terminology is at times reminiscent of 
Frankfurt’s. Freedom is “being with oneself” and “identity with 
oneself,” a self-relation in which the whole self stands behind and takes 
ownership of its actions and projects (Hegel 1991, 42). When we are 
fully autonomous, Hegel proposes, we are united with ourselves rather 
than alienated from who we actually are. We identify with our actions 
and see them as genuinely our own rather than in any way imposed 
upon us. Freedom is thus an integration of the self, not in the Kantian 
sense that desires conform to the commands of reason, but in the 
sense that no part of the self is fundamentally subject to any other.  
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Unlike Frankfurt, however, Hegel thinks that we cannot adequately 
address the problem of alienation simply by amending Kant’s 
conception of freedom. The problem of alienation is not just one of 
detachment from feelings, desires, and care, but also from the social 
world that frames them. From the moment we are born, we are already 
participants in a complex social world, one that shapes our interests 
and abilities at a deep level. We develop our particular identities and 
concerns through participation in the relationships, practices, and 
institutions that are available within our concrete social contexts. This 
is not to deny that we are individuals, but rather to note that who we 
are as individuals depends in a myriad of ways upon the social world 
in which we are situated.  Our social contexts do not determine 
everything about us, but they do play an essential role in constituting 
our identities and concerns. Hegel’s critique, then, is that Kantian 
freedom requires alienation not only from individual desires and cares, 
but also from the rich web of social relations that frames those desires 
and cares.  
If this is correct, then the nature and quality of our actual social 
relations are directly relevant to our prospects for freedom. Autonomy 
requires not just internal wholeheartedness, but also identifying with 
and being at home in one’s social world. As Hegel puts it, freedom is 
“being with oneself in another,” i.e. being unified with oneself through 
union with others (Hegel 1991, 42). And such union requires that the 
relationships, practices, and institutions of the social world be ones 
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that admit of reciprocal union. Otherwise, autonomy would be 
consistent with thoroughly internalized subjection. It is true that agent 
who is alienated from her own desires and cares is not fully 
autonomous, but nor is an agent who is oppressed by the practices, 
relationships, and institutions of her social world. And wholehearted 
love for an oppressor does not alter the underlying context of 
dehumanization and lack of reciprocity that frames such love.  
In what way, then, does Hegel think that love is essential to 
freedom? Like Frankfurt, he recognizes that love is more than just a 
feeling or desire, but he also insists that love, when most fully realized, 
is more than just a species of intrasubjective caring. Love is certainly 
comprised of feelings, desires, and care, but it is not fully encompassed 
by such internal states. Instead, Hegel proposes, love is also partially 
constituted by actual relationships with others. More specifically, love 
consists partly in creating and sustaining a shared identity with another. 
Love creates the shared self-understanding described by Barnes, that 
of “knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the 
other with me” (Hegel 1991, 199). In love, it is not just intrasubjective 
care that is essential to oneself, but also actual connection and 
integration with others. Hegel’s view is that love thus creates a “whole 
that is more than the sum of its parts” (Westphal 1993, 413). To love 
is to understand oneself in relation to another such that one’s identity 
is in part constituted by shared union with them.  
 16 
Love is “finding oneself in another,” Hegel proposes, the discovery 
and development of oneself through shared identity with another 
(Hegel 1971, 278-279). Its value lies in taking us outside of ourselves 
and expanding the boundaries of the self. For this reason, we 
experience love as “the most immense contradiction” (Hegel 1991, 
199). It is both the loss of self and the discovery of self. In love, “we 
are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with 
reference to another, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation 
as ourselves” (Hegel 1991, 199). Love is loss in that it creates the 
vulnerability of one’s identity being partially constituted by relationship 
with another. Those whom we love can inflict deep wounds because 
they are part of our own selves. But the union of love also creates joint 
growth; when people come together in love, they construct a shared 
identity that expands the narrow boundaries of their original selves. 
The contradiction, then, is that it is precisely by breaking down 
boundaries of the self that one develops the new identity of union with 
another. Love is discovering oneself by losing oneself.  
In this way, Hegel concludes, love gives us our first and primary 
experiences of freedom (Hegel 1991, 199). It enables us to become less 
alienated from ourselves through identification with something outside 
of the narrow bounds of the self. Love, finding oneself in another, is 
the development of an integrated self through union with another. 
Freedom, being with oneself in another, is the integration of self 
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through identification with one’s actual relationships, practices, 
institutions.  
However, the scope of freedom is wider than the scope of one’s 
relationship to oneself or to another person can ever be (Hegel 1979, 
255-256; Hegel 1991, 215-218). To be fully self-determining is to be at 
home with oneself through one’s participation not just in loving 
relationships, but also in a broad range of practices, institutions, and 
relationships that support freedom. Hegel thus describes freedom as a 
“modification” of love (Hegel 1971, 244). It is most fully achieved 
when the kind of unity experienced in love becomes not just 
integration with oneself or another person, but also with the broader 
social world within which one is embedded. Only then can we, as 
deeply social beings, be genuinely at home with ourselves in the world. 
This account emphasizes the deep connection between love and 
freedom, but it also explains how love can be in tension with freedom. 
Love alone is not sufficient for freedom because freedom depends 
upon conditions that are not encompassed by love (Hegel 1979 478). 
Actual loving relationships are always embedded within broader social 
frameworks that may be more or less free. Love may, for instance, be 
framed by deep oppression, as in the examples of slavery and plaçage. 
When a slave loves her master, she does experience a unity and sharing 
of selves with him, but that unity is fundamentally asymmetrical. As 
Aristotle recognized, such asymmetry deforms the sharing and 
integration of selves that occurs within loving relationships.  
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When love is deformed in this way, Hegel contends, it involves 
some degree of “deadening” or silencing of one of the partners (Hegel 
1971, 304). The sharing of selves is limited by the lack of reciprocity, 
such that one partner is an important sense not fully “present” to the 
other (Hegel 1971, 218, 247). Such loves do expand the boundaries of 
the self, but in such way that they also reflect and perpetuate an unjust 
social context. If this is correct, then the deference, subordination, and 
lack of reciprocity that Friedman describes within many heterosexual 
relationships represent malformations of love as well as serious 
impediments to autonomy. The locus of the problem is not an essential 
zero sum trade-off between autonomy and love, as Friedman suggests. 
Instead, the problem is that persistent oppression warps loving 
relationships so that they reflect and perpetuate that oppression rather 
than fully supporting the autonomy of both partners. 
Hegel himself failed to adequately grapple with actual oppression 
in his own time. His account of marriage, for instance, encodes an 
oppressive gender essentialism with a rigid differentiation of family 
roles (Hegel 1991, 206-207). Hegel did, in theory, recognize that men 
and women are equals, but he failed to consider the real inequalities 
that result when men alone are allowed to be active in the public sphere 
while women are confined to the home (Nicolacopoulos and 
Vassilacopoulos 1999; Stone 2012).  Moreover, while Hegel did reject 
the idea that any one race was inherently more rational than any other, 
he also insisted that races differed in essential ways owing to 
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geography, and that those differences carried moral weight (Zambrana 
2017). And though he praised the Haitian Revolution, which resulted 
from a successful slave uprising, he also viewed Sub-Saharan Africans 
as childlike and in need of exposure to the supposedly superior culture 
and education of Europeans (Buck-Morss 2009). He thus argued that 
trans-Atlantic slavery should only be eliminated gradually (Zambrana 
2017).  
However, despite these significant failures, Hegel’s thought does 
provide rich conceptual tools for explaining the connection between 
love and freedom. Love can also contribute in important ways to the 
living of a free and autonoous life, but it can also, Hegel realized, reflect 
and perpetuate oppression. I conclude with a contemporary example 
that demonstrates the explanatory depth gained by acknowledging the 
interpersonal dimensions of love and freedom. Kant regarded sexual 
desires as incapable of contributing to autonomy. In contrast, both 
Frankfurt and Hegel suggest sexual desires can be autonomous express 
and realize the loving union of partners (Frankfurt 1999; Hegel 1991, 
200-203). But do sexual desires still contribute to autonomy when 
those desires reflect and perpetuate oppression? 
For example, feminist thinkers and critical race theorists have 
persuasively critiqued the domination and humiliation of women and 
people of color that is typical within contemporary pornography 
(Collins 2000, MacKinnon 1989). Violent pornography, which 
constitutes an estimated 90% of the pornography on the internet, is 
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associated with fantasies about rape, choking, hitting, and other forms 
of violence as part of sex, and frequent exposure is correlated with 
committing acts of sexual aggression (Bridges et al. 2010; DeKesedery 
and Corsianos 2016; Wright et al. 2016). Even brief exposure causes 
men to exhibit more aggressive and negative attitudes toward women 
and to desire to watch more extremely violent pornography (Hargrave 
and Livingstone 2009). Exposure has significant effects not only on 
men but also women, influencing the “sexual scripts” of all who watch 
it. Pornography, as one team of researchers put it, creates expectations 
“that the way the characters perform sexually is a ‘normal’ and 
appropriate portrayal of reality” (Paolucci et al. 2000, 51). Increasingly, 
teenagers and young people are learning about sexual behavior and 
sexual desire by the pornography they encounter on the internet 
(Braithwaite et al. 2015; Orenstein 2016). 
What does pornography, then, “teach” people about sex? Women 
are most often portrayed as submissive objects, reduced to body parts, 
who have no desires of their own except to provide gratification to 
men (Dines 2011; MacKinnon 1989). Black men and women are 
ususally portrayed as hypersexual beings with excessive appetites, the 
former as abnormally large rapists of white women and the latter as 
willing victims of abuse by white men (Collins 2000; Cruz 2016; 
Williams 2004). Asian women are depicted as exotic and willing victims 
of torture by white men, while Asian men are portrayed in gay 
pornography as submissive to white men (Chou 2012; Fung 2015). 
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Latina women are depicted as spicy and always hungry for food and 
sex, especially anal sex with white men (Bernardi 2006). Such research 
shows that in obvious and consistent ways, much of the pornography 
available today manifests oppressive stereotypes and attitudes toward 
women and people of color. 
Are loving partners fully autonomous when they experience and 
act upon desires that have been shaped by the pornorgraphy industry? 
The presence of love between partners is not enough, Hegel’s account 
of love and autonomy suggests, to negate the domination and 
dehuminization that pornography today encodes. Loving sexual 
relationships are less autonomous to the extent that they reflect and 
perpetuate oppression. It is not the existence of any particular desire 
that is problematic but, as one researcher puts it, “rather the uniformity 
with which these narratives reappear and the uncomfortable 
relationship they have to real social conditions” of racism and sexism 
(Fung 2015, 241).  
Instead of pretending that love is isolated from social realities like 
sexist and racist sexual scripts, the challenge is to better understand the 
actual prospects for freedom in light of those realities. Hegel’s account, 
in contrast to Frankfurt’s, provides a rich conceptual framework for 
addressesing this challenge. Important theoretical resources are thus 
gained when we excplicitly attend to the significance of the 
interpersonal dimensions of both love and freedom.ii  
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i The contemporary German Liebe has a different root, liob, an earlier term for 
pleasure and joy. See Benveniste. 
ii Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the American Philosophical 
Association, the Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, the Northwest Philosophy 
Conference, and the North American Society for Social Philosophy. I am grateful 
to these audiences, and especially to J.M. Fritzman, Thomas Mulherin, Laura 
Papish, and Adam Thompson for their detailed and thoughtful comments.  
                                                 
